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The Government’s Tax Package (hereafter referred to as "NTS": a New Tax System for 
Australia) addresses a number of issues for families raised in Ingles’ 1997 CEPR Discussion 
Paper “Low Income Traps for Working Families”, but leaves others unresolved and falls short 
of full-scale structural reform.  For example, it reduces family payment tapers, but the new 
tapers continue to overlap with those under the Youth Allowance scheme.  It reduces the 
many different family payments to two (three, counting childcare), but allows these payments 
to abate simultaneously in some situations, which will particularly impact on the work 
decisions of a spouse. 
 
This paper proposes measures that address these specific problem areas.  However another 
approach is a full-scale structural reform.  The measures herein are all forms of 
harmonisation of the tax and social security systems; but ultimately more radical options 
(integration or full separation) might yield a system that is more rational and can produce a 
designed structure of effective tax rates. These options – along with the option of a Negative 










This paper considers options for addressing problems in the way the tax and social security 
systems interact.  These include 
•  complexity (in both systems), with associated lack of clarity, loss of client 
understanding, possibilities of poor take-up, and lack of equity (see eg Harding 1997, 
Dawkins et al 1998); 
•  high effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) over some income ranges due to tax and 
means test interactions, with associated "low income traps"
1
 (Ingles 1997, Beer 1998);  
•  "notches", where there is a 'sudden death' loss of benefit at some point; 
•  means test "stacking" – ie, where two or more means tested benefits are withdrawn over 
the same range of income; 
•  "churning", meaning that some clients both receive benefits and pay tax at the same 
time; and 
•  lack of support for many low wage earners just outside the boundaries of the transfer 
system, with pressures for yet more targeted payments for low-income earners (Dawkins 
and Freebairn 1997). 
These problems are sufficiently extensive to create the likelihood of perverse effects on 
work and savings, particularly for those at the margin of the labour force.  In addition, the fact 
that the two systems overlap widely, such that many clients are liable to tax and means testing 
on the same income, implies that administrative and compliance costs are likely to be 
unnecessarily high.  
The starting point for this paper is the social security reforms – the simplification of 
family payments and reduction in tapers - contained in the Government’s New Tax System 
(NTS – Costello 1998).  These reforms substantially reduce “Low income traps for working 
families” as described in Ingles 1997. 
This paper argues that while these reforms are very positive they could have gone 
further.  Particular problem areas remaining include: 
•  “stacking” of means tests for the new Family Tax Benefit (FTB) and Youth Allowances, 
which creates high effective tax rates (ETRs); 
•  “stacking” of means tests for FTB parts (A) and (B), causing disincentives for working 
wives in particular; 
•  high ETRs for couples on the allowance margins (ie on single incomes just above the 
minimum wage). 
These problems are detailed below, and some remedies suggested. However it must be 
recognised at the outset that dealing with ETR problems is like dealing with a rubber ball that 
bulges in places: pushing in the bulge at one spot inevitably causes it to bulge somewhere 
else.  High ETRs can be levelled down only by raising tax rates for others, or taxes in general. 
Ultimately the question becomes one of the optimal structure of tax rates on both the 
beneficiary and the non-beneficiary populations (discussed in Ingles 1998a).  That article 
concludes that the case for a linear structure of marginal tax rates is not unambiguous, and 
                                                 




that there may be merit in the current approach of high effective taxes on low incomes – at 
least until better information is available on the effects of changing tax/taper rates. 
The NTS provides for a sweeping reform of the family payment system (details in 
Appendix A).  One part of this is a substantial increase in family payment thresholds, to avoid 
"sudden death" losses for some people coming off benefit.  Further, there is a cut in the taper 
on family payment
2
 from the present 50 per cent to 30 per cent.  I will show that this keeps 
ETRs below 75-85 per cent over the relevant taper zones, a substantial improvement on 
existing ETRs. 
Reform of family assistance raises a number of issues.  The means test for the new 
“Family Tax Benefit” Part A — FTB(A) — overlaps with that for the old Austudy cum new 
Youth Allowance.  These interactions are potentially quite serious. There is therefore a case 
for action in relation to Youth Allowance thresholds and tapers in multiple child families.  
The specific proposal contained here could be implemented for a comparatively modest cost 
of around $200-300m pa. 
Further, stacking between the means tests for FTB (A), FTB (B), and Parenting Payment 
(Partnered) has the potential to be a problem in terms of the work incentives facing spouses 
with young children.  This can be addressed for little or no net cost provided we are willing to 
accept some redistribution within the family payment system.  The specific option proposed is 
that FTB(B) be added to the base rate for FTB(A), and abolished as a separate payment.  This 
means that there would no longer be any circumstances where the two payments could abate 
simultaneously. 
The Keating and Lambert (1998a and b) proposal for aggregating all family payments 
and tapering them sequentially would be one means of rationalising means test interactions.  
This apepr argues however that it could be substantially implemented by the strategy outlined 
here of unstacking FTB, Youth Allowance and possibly Rent Allowance by provision of 
appropriate disregards in the relevant means tests.  Nonetheless it provides a useful concept 
for guiding further reform. 
Outside of the families area, another set of reform options involves reductions in tapers 
on basic income support payments, notably the allowance taper which remains at 50 per cent 
cum 70 per cent under the NTS (the pension taper reduces to 40 per cent).  However there are 
problems with reducing the allowance taper; it is expensive, and it extends assistance further 
up the income scale to people whom many might not consider to be "in need".  It can thus 
exacerbate inequities between those in, and those outside of, the categorically eligible 
population.  Finally, it can create problems for the family payment system, given that family 
payments cannot sensibly commence to taper until after basic income support is fully abated.  
To conclude, while a single taper of 60 per cent might be a useful short-term reform goal, 
priority needs to be given to reducing taxes on all low-income families, irrespective of 
whether they are working or in the allowance system. 
 
1.1  Some Basic Parameters 
Social security terminology is not always clear.  In this paper pensions are defined as all those 
benefits having a pension-like means test — ie a $53/$94 pw free area and 40 per cent taper 
(including the aged, Disability Support pensioners and sole parents who are now receiving 
"Parenting Payment - Unpartnered" – PPU).  Allowances are those benefits having an 
                                                 
2    Family payment is a generic term covering the old minimum and base rate family allowance, and the new “family tax 
benefit” under the NTS.  
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allowance income test: ie a smaller $31 pw free area and 50/70 per cent taper (see below).  
Benefits is a generic term covering both pensions and allowances. 
The pension withdrawal rate on income in excess of the free areas has reduced from 50 
to 40 per cent under the NTS.  By contrast the allowance system parameters are almost 
unchanged, apart from small increases in thresholds. The free area for the main allowance-
type benefits (Newstart Allowance (NSA), Parenting Payment (Partnered) (PPP) etc) is $31 
pw, for each adult.  The initial taper is 50 per cent but this rises to 70 per cent beyond $72 pw, 
except in the case of a Parenting Payment (Partnered) Allowee for whom the second step now 
occurs at $121.50 pw.  
For pension the income unit is the couple; for Newstart Allowance/PPP couples it is an 
amalgam of individual and combined income unit.  The personal income test applies to each 
of a married couple.  However, once the high-income earner ceases to receive Newstart 
Allowance/PPP any additional income received by them tapers the partner’s payment at 70 
per cent.  
By contrast the tax unit is predominantly the individual, although this is modified by the 
dependent spouse rebate (DSR) and the Medicare levy.  The interaction of the individual tax 
unit and the couple unit mainly used in the social security system is the cause of some of the 
problems in social security and tax interactions, an issue addressed explicitly in Discussion 
Paper 424 (Part 2 of this set). 
Most basic pensions and allowances are taxable, Disability Support Pension (DSP) 
being a notable exception.  However a system of rebates operates to protect full-rate 
beneficiaries from being subject to tax.  Family payments and Rent Allowance are not subject 
to taxation.  The reason for this is that to assess these as taxable income would lower the 
effective tax threshold for families, and therefore undermine the adequacy of these payments 
unless they were grossed up considerably – thereby increasing the apparent level of welfare 
outlays without having any effect on the actual adequacy of the payments themselves. 
If a benefit is not taxable the taper rate and tax rate can be added to give the EMTR 
applying.  If it is taxable, the interactive effect means that the EMTR is less than the sum of 
those two rates, since tax applies to the increment to private income less the loss of benefit.  
A similar procedure applies when two means tests are "stacked": ie, it is not always 
appropriate to simply add their taper rates in order to calculate the EMTR. 
 
1.2  Means test tapers and effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) 
The effective tax rate which applies at any level of income needs to be calculated by reference 
to both the tax and social security systems.  In practice, quite complicated computer models 
are used to do this; the results are often shown graphically by plotting the effective marginal 
tax rate (EMTR) against private income.  It is usual to also plot disposable income on the 
same graph, since the two are closely related.
3  Chart 1 shows an example, for an allowee 
couple as at July 2000.  
It must be stressed that these sorts of calculations necessarily embody a range of 
simplifying assumptions, such that the EMTRs shown are somewhat theoretical and may not 
reflect the actual incentives facing a family at a point in time. For example, in the case of 
Youth Allowance the income tests normally relate to a prior financial year, whereas the 
calculations assume that all income tests operate on a current annual basis – or, equivalently, 
                                                 
3    Mathematically, the derivative of the disposable income graph with respect to private income gives the effective 
marginal gain, which equals 1-EMTR.   
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that income is spread evenly over and within years, such that the exact definition of the 
income period makes no difference to the outcome.  This is one reason for uncertainty about 






High EMTRs show as dips or plateaus in the disposable income line.  People find it 
difficult or impossible to improve their net income position by earning more over such 
ranges. Chart 1 shows that an allowee couple gains relatively little from earnings between $50 
and $500 pw.  High EMTRs affect most basic allowance payments, notwithstanding the 1994 
reforms to Newstart Allowance and related payments reducing the maximum rate of taper 
from 100 per cent to 70 per cent and introducing a partly individual basis of assessment.  
 
 
2  IMPACT OF THE GOVERNMENT’S NEW TAX SYSTEM (NTS) 
EMTR graphs can conveniently be reduced to summary measures of effective average tax 
rates (EATRs), calculated over a given range of income.  This is the basis of Table 1, which 
summarises effective tax rates affecting a range of client family types in $100 bands up to 
$1,000.  This table illustrates that there are some bands of income where families either gain 
marginally by earning extra income, or in some cases may go backwards. 
This Table shows two "hotspots" where very high ETRs (over 85 per cent) continue to 
occur even after the implementation of the NTS.  The first set relates to allowee couples with 
an income of between $400 and $500 a week.  In this income range loss of allowance (taper = 
70 per cent) co-exists with income tax of up to 30 per cent, resulting in ETRs over 90 per cent 
Chart 1: EMTRs and disposable income
NSA/PPP Allowee couple - rates at July 2000
No children, paying private rent of $200.00pw,





























































Weekly Disposable Income EMTR 
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and hence very small net gains. 
Another problem area concerns spouses of low wage earners in the income range $100 
to $200 a week.  This is where the loss of family payments can become a serious work 
disincentive (ETRs exceed 85 per cent), especially if childcare costs were to be taken into 
account. 
Table 2 summarises effective average tax rates for a range of families, and the impact 
that the NTS package has had.  It has four columns.  Col 1 shows EATRs calculated over the 
range from the benefit free area to the cutout point; Col 2 shows EATRs over the family 
payment threshold to the cutout; Col 3 combines Cols 1 and 2; and Col 4 calculates the 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 1   NET INCOME GAIN TO FAMILY UNIT FROM INCREASING EARNINGS BY 
$100 INCREMENTS FOR VARIOUS FAMILY TYPES AT JULY 2000
 Basic Allowances and Family Tax Benefits
Rent Maximum Net Gains Made Over $100 per week Gross Private Income Ranges
Family/Income 
Status Assistance  Benefit pw $0-100 $101-200 $201-300 $301-400 $401-500 $501-600 $601-700 $701-800 $801-900 $901-1001
without RA $175.20 $45.58 $21.58 $24.63 $78.89 $66.23 $68.50 $68.50 $68.50 $68.50 $64.65
with RA $215.90 $45.58 $21.58 $19.53 $43.29 $66.23 $68.50 $68.50 $68.50 $68.50 $64.65
without RA $316.20 $45.58 $24.49 $21.13 $21.29 $10.85 $68.50 $68.50 $68.50 $68.50 $64.65
with RA $354.70 $45.58 $24.49 $21.13 $21.29 $6.75 $34.10 $68.50 $68.50 $68.50 $64.65
without RA $388.17 $45.58 $24.49 $27.79 $31.39 $12.28 $52.69 $47.61 $70.00 $70.00 $66.15
with RA $435.77 $45.58 $24.49 $27.79 $31.39 $11.15 $44.82 $38.50 $38.50 $58.51 $64.65
without RA $446.83 $45.58 $24.49 $27.79 $31.39 $12.28 $43.69 $38.50 $38.50 $38.50 $44.96
with RA $494.43 $45.58 $24.49 $27.79 $31.39 $12.28 $43.69 $38.50 $38.50 $38.50 $44.96
without RA $576.07 $41.79 $17.27 $47.76 $48.89 $64.14 $68.50 $68.50 $68.50 $68.50 $48.50
with RA $623.67 $41.79 $17.27 $47.76 $48.89 $36.23 $48.81 $68.50 $68.50 $68.50 $48.50
without RA $310.21 $79.23 $42.30 $39.10 $36.07 $36.18 $30.29 $46.11 $68.50 $68.50 $64.65
with RA $357.81 $79.23 $42.30 $39.10 $36.07 $36.18 $30.29 $38.50 $38.50 $58.51 $64.65
without RA $368.87 $82.70 $42.30 $38.26 $36.88 $42.00 $21.03 $38.50 $38.50 $66.41 $64.65
with RA $416.47 $82.70 $42.30 $38.26 $36.88 $42.00 $21.03 $38.50 $38.50 $38.50 $44.96
Source:  FACS Modelling Unit, 'A New Tax System' (ANTS) model.
NOTES:
* The Federal minimum wage is  $400 pw  in July 2000. 
Calculations for the one child scenarios assume that the child is under 5 years of age and for the two children scenarios, that 1 is under 5 years and 1 is between 5 and 12 years of age.
Where both partners are on income support, calculations assume private income is received by NSA partner.  Where one partner is on a minimum wage, calculations assume
private income is received by their spouse.
The following is a guide to the colour codes:
italics          Net Gains of between less than $15 per week
bold          Net Gains of between $15-30 per week
SPP (single), 2 
children
SPP (single), 1 child
NSA/PA couple, no 
children







(partnered) couple,  
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Although Col 4 shows lower EATRs than do the other columns, it is interesting that the 
EATRs so calculated are still all over 57 per cent, and as high as 80 per cent.  
Table 3 shows the percentage point reduction due to the NTS for each of these family types.  
The NTS will have a marked impact on family payment ETRs, reducing them by between 12 and 
30 percentage points.  The "low income trap" for families, described in Ingles (1997), can therefore 
be regarded as pretty well resolved except for the specific problems which will be discussed. 
Table 2: COMPARISON OF EFFECTIVE TAX RATES: PRE- AND POST- the NTS (JULY 2000)
pre post- pre post- pre post- pre post-
ANTS ANTS ANTS ANTS ANTS ANTS ANTS ANTS
FAMILY TYPE AFP ETR FTB ETR
1 sole parent, I child, RA 0.62 0.61 0.89 0.61 0.71 0.62 0.64 0.57
2 sole parent, 2 children, RA 0.64 0.62 0.89 0.65 0.74 0.63 0.66 0.58
3 sole parent, 3 children, RA 0.65 0.61 0.91 0.69 0.78 0.66 0.70 0.61
4s o l e   parent, 2 children 0.63 0.62 0.89 0.67 0.72 0.63 0.63 0.57
5 NSA/PPP couple, I child, RA  0.81 0.76 0.90 0.62 0.81 0.69 0.77 0.66
100:0 income split
6 NSA/PPP couple, 2 children, RA 0.78 0.76 0.75 0.58 0.80 0.67 0.74 0.64
 50% split 
7 NSA/PPP couple, 2 children, RA 0.81 0.76 0.88 0.63 0.80 0.68 0.77 0.66
 100 split
8 single NSA, no children, RA 0.82 0.80 0.76 0.73
9 single NSA, no children 0.79 0.78 0.72 0.70
10 NSA couple, no children, RA 0.85 0.83 0.80 0.78
 100 split
11 NSA couple, no children 0.80 0.79 0.73 0.71
RA, 50% split
12 single age pensioner, no children 0.73 0.63 0.65 0.57
RA
13 single age pensioner, no children 0.68 0.61 0.60 0.55
14 Age pension couple, RA, 100 split 0.76 0.65 0.68 0.59
15 Age pension couple, no children 0.74 0.63 0.65 0.57
100 split
NOTES 1 child - under 5; 2 children; 1 under 5 and 1 5-12; 3 children add child 13-15.
ETR: effective tax rate RA - receives maximum Rent Allowance
AFP: additional family payment PPP - Parenting payment (partnered)
FTB: family tax benefit NSA - Newstart Allowance







It is interesting to note that ETRs for sole parents do not fall by much, despite the 10 
percentage point reduction in their taper.  This appears to be due, in part, to the ‘cashing out’ 
of the sole parent rebate in an expanded Family Tax Benefit Part B.  As such, the benefit no 
longer reduces sole parent EMTRs over the initial range of taxable income. 
Prima facie, it would be desirable if the range of EATRs between client types and across 
income cells were such that all clients had a continuous incentive to increase their declared 
income. 
Whether it is optimal to have a single marginal rate across all these cells, or a 
high/low/medium rate structure like that under the current system is an issue discussed in 
Ingles 1998a.  This paper will propose reforms on the assumption that the current structure of 
effective tax burdens will not be too radically changed in the short term: that is, that a 








1 sole parent, I child, RA 0.01 0.28 0.09 0.07
2 sole parent, 2 children, RA 0.02 0.24 0.11 0.08
3 sole parent, 3 children, RA 0.04 0.22 0.12 0.09
4 sole parent, 2 children 0.01 0.22 0.09 0.06
5 NSA/PgA couple, I child, RA  0.05 0.28 0.12 0.11
100:0 income split
6 NSA/PgA couple, 2 children, RA 0.02 0.17 0.13 0.10
 50% split 
7 NSA/PgA couple, 2 children, RA 0.05 0.25 0.12 0.11
 100 split
8 single NSA, no children, RA 0.02 0.03
9 single NSA, no children 0.01 0.02
10 NSA/PgA couple, no children, RA 0.02 0.02
 100 split
11 NSA/PgA couple, no children 0.01 0.02
RA, 50% split
12 single age pensioner, no children 0.10 0.08
RA
13 single age pensioner, no children 0.07 0.05
14 Age pension couple, RA, 100 split 0.11 0.09
15 Age pension couple, no children 0.11 0.08
100 split
Source: calculated form Table 2
NOTES: see notes to Table 2 
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high/low/ medium rate structure will continue to prevail, and that allowances will be ‘taxed 
back’ more quickly than pensions.  This assumption is not critical, however, and the major 
policy options proposed in Part two provide the flexibility to move the overall rate structure 
in any desired direction. 
One final point deserves some attention. The typical EMTR graph for social security 
recipients looks like a high rise city block with peaks, troughs, protuberances and spikes
4
.  Is 
this a problem that needs attention? 
Policy analysts find this sort of thing aesthetically displeasing.  Whether it constitutes an 
actual problem, however, is another question.  Certainly clients are unlikely to be fully aware 
of how this affects them, and in my view the important thing is the average ETR calculated 
over some sufficiently wide range of income, such as shown in Tables 1 and 2.   
The other important thing is that the graph of disposable income should rise fairly 
smoothly with income; if anomalies in the EMTR schedule cause marked dips and hollows in 
the disposable income line then they should be regarded as a policy problem.  One aim of the 
options presented here will be to smooth out such anomalies. 
 
2.1  How extensive is the high EMTR problem? 
Work on the distribution of EMTRs by income class (eg Harding and Polette 1995, Beer 
1998) suggests that "only 6 per cent of the population, just over half a million people, face 
EMTRs in excess of 60 per cent" (Beer 1998 p266).  Beer and Harding (1999) put this figure 
at 7 per cent.  On these figures, EMTRs may not be a burning issue.   
However, Beer also notes that the figures are likely to be underestimates due to certain 
exclusions.  These include childcare, HECS
5
, and state housing rental rebates (p265). She 
observes: "...individuals with very high incomes are escaping high EMTRs while those with 
low-middle incomes ... are most likely to face high EMTRs" (p268).  Further, she notes a high 
proportion of individuals with children in the high EMTR ranges (pp268).   
Beer and Harding (1999) indicate that the NTS reforms, while lowering the family 
payment tapers and reducing the peaks in EMTRs, spreads them across a wider range of 
family incomes: “...potentially about 85,000 single income families with children have been 
newly drawn into the shade-out range for Family Tax Benefit Part A –…and will for the first 
time face EMTRs above 60 per cent” (p21).  This is of course an inevitable result of 
“levelling down” peak EMTRs by shading tapers into other income ranges.  This paper also 
notes that the “vast majority of those who face high EMTRs also have wage and salary 
income” (p10). 
A particular problem in interpreting work on the distribution of EMTRs is that we really 
do not know the extent to which the existing income distribution is already influenced by the 
EMTR schedule.  For example, among the pensioner population we find a very high 
incidence of individuals with incomes below the free area who, on the Harding/Polette and 
Beer measures, face an EMTR of zero.  But would they have such low incomes if there were 
no pension means test? 
 
 
                                                 
4    In some cases, the EMTR spikes are of infinite height, as reflected in the “sudden death” losses (notches) in the 
disposable income line.  These spikes are not shown on the graphs. 




Another problem is that EMTR studies don’t pick up the effect of losing various 
allowances and concessions if income exceeds relevant thresholds.  Cowling (1998) notes 
that the loss of these “- most notably the Health Care Card, Rent Assistance and State 
Government concessions on energy, water, sewage, municipal rates and transport …– was 
much more significant in the decision-making process than any consideration of payment 
thresholds and taper rates” (p28). 
The argument for fixing up high EMTRs is not really founded in empirical studies of 
their current impact.  Rather, it is based on the notion that: 
•  high EMTRs are unfair to the affected clients; 
•  we don’t know how much damage they are doing, although it is likely they are equally 
as damaging in the social security system as they are in the direct tax system (where a 
lot of effort has gone into reducing them); and  
•  it's not necessary to take the risk.  The problem is fixable; technical solutions are 
available which don’t necessarily cost a lot and have other advantages in terms of 
income redistribution objectives, so why live with it? 
That is not to deny that it would be extremely useful if more were known about how high 
EMTRs actually affect behaviour. 
 
2.2  Free area for family payment 
The full rate of Additional Family Payment and Rent Allowance is paid automatically to 
those receiving any basic income support payment (called ‘auto’-AFP).  Thus, when clients 
cease to be eligible for such a payment, they receive only the part-rate applicable to their new 
income situation.  Hence, there can be "sudden death" losses for clients on reaching the cutout 
points
6.
  (This is also referred to in the literature as a “notch” problem.)  
The NTS increased the threshold for the new integrated family payment (Family Tax 
Benefit Part A) to $28,200.  This almost addresses the “sudden death” problem for allowees, 
and indeed would have done so fully but for the 1999 Budget decision to expand the range of 
the initial 50 per cent taper for the Parenting Payment (Partnered) from $62-142 to $62-245 a 
fortnight.  This has again introduced a notch problem (depending on how the couple’s income 
is split).  This could be addressed by lifting the new FTB(A) threshold slightly.   
In a similar manner some pensioner couples, who also receive the full rate of family 
payment automatically, can suffer a "sudden death" loss if their income exceeds the pension 
cutouts
7.
 Single pensioners (sole parents) are not affected by the notch problem, since their 
pension cuts out below the family payment threshold.  Such problems are exacerbated for 
pensioners after July 1, due to the lower pension taper of 40 per cent.  The following table 
shows the extent of the notch on the assumption that the couples’ income is split 100:0 (in the 




                                                 
6    For allowee couples with incomes split anywhere between 86/14 per cent to 14/86 per cent, the loss is currently $24.10 
pw with one child and $18 pw with two.  The loss decreases with number of children, due to the impact of the child 
disregard in the family payment means test.  There is no loss if there are 6 or more children. 
7    For pensioner couples, this loss was $ 36.50 pw with one child; $72.60 pw with two, and $87.05 pw with a third child 




Table 4 “sudden death loss” ($ pw) on exceeding pension cutout: 
July 2000 
       
DSP/PPP couple  No RA  With RA 
1 child under 5  41.10  88.70 
2 children (<5, 5-12)  80.80  128.40 




Chart 2 shows how the disposable income of a DSP/PPP couple falls markedly at this 
notch point (numbered 8 on the graph).  The result, in this 3-child example, is that the couple 
gains almost no income from earnings in the range $500 to $1,000 pw.  One ameliorating 





It would be expensive to push out the family payment thresholds to levels approaching 
the new pension cutouts which, for a couple, are well in excess of average weekly earnings.  
One solution here might involve the abolition of pension type payments for those under 
pension age, and the creation of a "single workforce age payment" means tested closer to 
allowance lines.  Only those aged 65 or over would be entitled to the more generous pension 
means test.  Age pensioners would not be eligible for FTB, although they could apply for a 
workforce age payment if this was to their advantage.  Very few age pensioners have 
dependent children.   
Chart 2: DSP/PPP couple at July 2000
Children under 5 = 1, children 5-12 = 1, children 13-15 = 1,




































2.3  Two-step or one-step taper? 
The Government's Tax Package combines 
•  Minimum Family Payment 
•  Family Allowance Supplement, and 
•  Family Tax Payment (FTP) part A 
into a single Family Tax Benefit (FTB) Part A with a maximum rate slightly higher 
than the current combination of payments, and lower taper of 30 per cent
8
. 
The new FTB(A) continues to have the same two-part taper as the current system, albeit 
that sudden death losses of basic family payment around the $70,000 annual family income 
level no longer occur, these being replaced by another 30 per cent taper on incomes exceeding 
$73,000 pa. 
The problem with the two-part taper – which admittedly is an established part of the 
family payment system – is that it makes the system into a hybrid which is not consistently 
directed towards either poverty alleviation or horizontal equity.  In terms of welfare, such a 
two-part taper can usually be improved upon by a single, lower taper that costs the same.  The 
reason is that the single taper redistributes from higher income to middle income families, 
and is thus unequivocally redistributive, and does so with very little or no net cost in terms of 
incentives, since all those now subject to the first tier of the taper and most of those subject to 
the second tier face a lower EMTR.  Only those families between the first-tier cutouts and the 
second tier thresholds face an increased EMTR. 
Ingles (1997) and Keating and Lambert (1998a) propose a similar reform.  Ingles 
suggested that a single 25 per cent taper would be approximately cost-neutral compared with 
the (then) current system; Keating and Lambert suggested a 30 per cent taper (theirs is higher 
due to other changes involved in their proposal, as described later in this Paper).  However, 
there would be some losers on medium to high incomes (around $35-65,000), notably those 
with only one or two children.9 Such families do not gain sufficiently from the lower taper to 
compensate them for the loss of minimum FTB(A).   
Following the NTS changes, a lower single taper of around 20 per cent might be cost 
neutral.  Specifically, minimum FTB(A) of $18.50 a week would be abolished, and FTB(A) 
grossed up to $57.85 pw (ages 0-12) and $73.30 pw (13-15).  A single taper of, say, 20 per 
cent would apply.  The impact of the proposal on a family with three children is shown in 
Chart 3.  It can be seen that families earning between $600 and $1200 pw gain; there are 
some losers on family incomes between $1200 and $1400 pw.  The pattern of gains and 




                                                 
8    It is a pity it does not take the opportunity to abolish the large family element of FA, which has no consistent rationale in 
the current system. 
9    An option would be to "grandfather" current entitlements so that there were no current losers (although there would be 





2.4  Youth Allowance  and family payment overlaps 
Quite severe ETRs can be experienced by those families with a Youth Allowance child in 
addition to family payment children.  The Youth Allowance threshold was not raised under 
the NTS, leaving it, at $23,400, well below the new $28,200 threshold for FTB(A). While 
there are additional disregards for other children under Youth Allowance, they are not always 
sufficiently high to prevent overlapping tapers.   
In consequence, for many families the presence of a Youth Allowance child in addition 
to other dependent children will result in there being some income range where ETRs exceed 
100 per cent – ie, where disposable income actually falls as private income rises.  This 
problem, illustrated in Table 5, is recognised in the Report of the Reference Group Welfare 
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  Table 5    NET INCOME GAIN TO FAMILY UNIT FROM INCREASING EARNINGS BY $100 
INCREMENTS FOR VARIOUS FAMILY TYPES AT JULY 2000 
 Youth Allowance and Family Tax Benefit Interaction
Family Income Status Rent Maximum  Net Gains Made Over $100 per week Gross Private Income Ranges
Assistance  Benefit pw $0-100 $101-200 $201-300 $301-400 $401-500 $501-600 $601-700 $701-800 $801-900 $901-1,000
NSA/PP (partnered) with without RA $418.15 $45.38 $24.22 $21.39 $10.39 ($10.08) $37.13 $43.50 $46.32 $68.50 $64.65
1 YA recipient with RA $438.27 $45.38 $24.22 $21.39 $10.39 ($10.08) $19.82 $40.69 $46.32 $68.50 $64.65
NSA/PP (partnered) with 2  without RA $528.15 $45.38 $24.22 $24.54 $31.39 $9.95 $33.04 $9.47 $18.38 $53.53 $64.65
children and 1 YA recipient with RA $576.29 $45.38 $24.22 $24.54 $31.39 $9.95 $33.04 $9.47 $13.50 $23.53 $51.40
NSA/PP (partnered) with 1  without RA $567.07 $45.38 $24.22 $24.54 $31.39 $9.95 $29.91 ($2.60) $18.50 $22.76 $52.82
child and 2 YA recipients with RA $615.21 $45.38 $24.22 $24.54 $31.39 $9.95 $29.91 ($15.53) ($11.50) $17.55 $52.82
Source:  FACS Modelling Unit, 'A New Tax System' (ANTS) model.
NOTES:
It is assumed that 100 per cent of private income accrues to the head (ie. main earner).
Calculations for the single YA recipient only scenario assumes NSA/Parenting Payment (partnered) parents with the YA child aged 16-17 years of age.
Calculations for the one YA recipient scenarios assumes NSA/Parenting Payment (partnered) parents with the YA child aged 16-17 years and two FTB children - one 5-12 years and one 13-15 years of age.
Calculations for the two YA recipients scenarios assumes NSA/Parenting Payment (partnered) parents with one YA child aged 16-17 years, the other aged 18-25 years and one FTB child 13-15 years of age.
The following is a guide to the colour codes:
(bold itals)          Net Losses
bold          Net Gains of between $0 and $20 per week
         Net Gains of between $20 and $30 per weekThe extension of the parental income test to the young unemployed has greatly increased 
the numbers subject to stacking. Keating and Lambert estimated that up to 40,000 families 
will be affected by stacking between FTB and Youth Allowance (1998b p287).  However, it 
should be noted that, notwithstanding such problems, these families are still better off under 
the NTS. 
Chart 4 shows EMTRs for a couple with two Youth Allowance and two other children.  
The very wide range of private incomes where disposable income gains are extremely small 






There are other problems with Youth Allowance.  One is that a family coming off 
allowance (and receiving auto-max Youth Allowance) can suffer a “sudden death” loss of 
Youth Allowance.  A further concern is that certain additional benefits are lost when a 
dependent child moves onto Youth Allowance – notably Guardian’s Allowance and Rent 
Allowance.  Thus, the family may be better off on FTB(A) than Youth Allowance, 
notwithstanding the higher maximum rates under the latter. 
The second problem has been partially addressed by extending the age limit for FTB(A). 
However, giving families a choice as to which benefit to receive is not really a long-term 
solution to such problems.  First, a rational choice requires a high degree of knowledge as to 
the relevant provisions.  Second, the system fails to discriminate between families on the 
basis of relative need.  It is well established in equivalence scale research that costs of 
Chart 4: NSA/PPP couple with YA children at July 2000
Ch.< 5 = 0, Ch. 5-12 = 1, Ch. 13-15 = 1     Pay no rent, 100% of priv. Inc. to head,
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children rise with age, whereas the system fails to consistently direct extra assistance to some 
families with older dependent children. A fuller resolution would need to involve 
incorporating Youth Allowance into an integrated family payment system for all children up 
to, say age twenty-one. 
 
2.4.1  Option for integrating Youth Allowance and family payment income tests 
This ‘unstacking’ option, described in detail in Appendix B, addresses three issues: 
1.  stacking between the allowance means test and the Youth Allowance taper over the 
income range $23,400 and $28,200 pa (this can give rise to a “sudden death” loss of up 
to $1200 pa in “auto” Youth Allowance); 
2.  stacking between the taper on the new FTB(A) and Youth Allowance (the 30 per cent 
and 25 per cent tapers are additive once the Youth Allowance disregard of $1200 for the 
first sibling under 16 is used up, causing EMTRs of over 85 per cent).  This could cause 
a significant work disincentive for families in the income range $30,000- $40,000 (the 
exact range depends on number and age of Youth Allowance and non-Youth Allowance 
children); and 
3.  the Youth Allowance income test stacks on itself if there is more than one Youth 
Allowance child, since existing disregards of $3,400 per Youth Allowance sibling are 
insufficient to prevent this occurring.  Such stacking can lead to EMTRs of over 80 per 
cent, or higher if there are also non-Youth Allowance dependent children. 
Unstacking the whole system will be costly.  A possible cost offset would be to raise the 
Youth Allowance taper from 25 to 30 per cent; this would appear to be a logical move in any 
case, assuming the family payment taper remains at 30 per cent.   
 
2.4.2  Conclusion: Youth Allowance reform 
The effect of the three options in Appendix B, taken together, would be to create a situation 
where (apart from Rent Allowance), Youth Allowance and FTB(A) were very close to an 
integrated system.  Except for renters, no family would lose more than 30 cents in the dollar 
of welfare benefits as private income rises.  Combined with the standard income tax rate of 
30 per cent, EMTRs would be close to 60 per cent for most affected families (except Rent 
Allowance recipients also receiving Youth Allowance).  Although this is still high, it is 























































Table 6: Impact of proposed YA integration scheme relative to July 2000 (ANTS)
  Youth Allowance and Family Tax Benefit Interaction at July 2000
Family Income Status Rent Max Net Gains Made Over $100 per week Gross Private Income Ranges (income split 75:25)
 Ass/ce  Benefit pw $0-100 $101-200 $201-300 $301-400 $401-500 $501-600 $601-700 $701-800 $801-900 $901-1,000
NSA/PP (partnered) with nil $418.15 $66.10 $26.10 $26.10 $21.20 $20.30 $13.10 $46.90 $49.90 $72.10 $72.20
1 YA recipient with RA $438.27 $65.90 $26.30 $26.10 $21.20 $20.30 ($4.20) $44.10 $49.90 $72.10 $72.20
NSA/PP (partnered) with 2  nil $528.15 $65.95 $26.30 $26.10 $21.20 $24.90 $13.50 $12.80 $22.00 $56.70 $72.20
children and 1 YA recipient with RA $576.29 $66.00 $26.20 $26.10 $21.30 $24.90 $13.40 $12.80 $17.20 $26.70 $58.90
NSA/PP (partnered) with 1 nil $567.07 $66.00 $26.20 $26.10 $21.20 $24.90 $11.10 $0.70 $22.20 $25.80 $59.60
 child and 2 YA recipients with RA $615.21 $66.00 $26.20 $26.10 $21.30 $24.90 $11.00 ($12.20) ($7.80) $20.60 $59.60
Table 2b: impact of integration proposals
Family/Income Status Rent Maximum Net Gains Made Over $100 per week Gross Private Income Ranges (income split 75:25)
 Ass/ce Benefit pw $0-100 $101-200 $201-300 $301-400 $401-500 $501-600 $601-700 $701-800 $801-900 $901-1,000
NSA/PP (partnered) with nil $418.20 $66.10 $26.20 $26.40 $21.10 $20.20 $28.10 $41.80 $42.10 $69.80 $72.20
1 YA recipient with RA $438.30 $66.10 $26.20 $26.40 $21.20 $20.10 $10.80 $39.00 $42.10 $69.80 $72.20
NSA/PP (partnered) with 2  nil $528.15 $66.17 $26.21 $26.32 $21.18 $24.90 $27.36 $37.83 $47.00 $56.03 $42.12
children and 1 YA recipient with RA $576.29 $66.17 $26.20 $26.33 $21.18 $24.90 $27.35 $37.83 $42.13 $26.02 $28.87
NSA/PP (partnered) with 1 nil $567.10 $66.10 $26.30 $26.30 $21.20 $24.90 $27.30 $50.80 $47.90 $42.20 $42.10
 child and 2 YA recipients with RA $615.20 $66.20 $26.20 $26.30 $21.20 $24.90 $27.30 $37.90 $18.00 $36.90 $42.10
NOTES:
It is assumed that 75 per cent of private income accrues to the head (ie. main earner).
Calculations for the single YA recipient only scenario assumes NSA/Parenting Payment (partnered) parents with the YA child aged 16-17 years of age.
Calculations for the one YA recipient scenarios assumes NSA/Parenting Payment (partnered) parents with the YA child aged 16-17 years and two FTB children - one 5-12 years and one 13-15 years of age.
Calculations for the two YA recipients scenarios assumes NSA/Parenting Payment (partnered) parents with one YA child aged 16-17 years, the other aged 18-25 years and one FTB child 13-15 years of age.
The following is a guide to the cell formats bold italics         Net gain is negative
bold          Net Gains of between $0 and $15 per week








The total cost of the “unstacking” package comes to an estimated $200-300 million pa (the 
higher cost applies if the taper is left at 25 per cent). There would be few if any losers from the 
package, with the higher thresholds overcompensating for the slightly higher (30 per cent) taper.  
An estimated 40 per cent of families currently receiving part-rate Youth Allowance would 
benefit. 
Stacking will continue to be an issue for those receiving Youth Allowance and Rent 
Allowance, and for those receiving FTB(B).  It may be appropriate to allow Rent Allowance to 
stack with Youth Allowance, as is now done.  Alternatively, tapering of Youth Allowance could 
be held off until Rent Allowance is exhausted (an option consistent with Keating and Lambert’s 
proposals (see below).   
Full integration of Rent Allowance and Youth Allowance requires that Youth Allowance 
disregards be set sufficiently high such that all Rent Allowance is lost before Youth Allowance 
starts to taper (or visa versa).  For larger families, these thresholds could be very high indeed: see 
the discussion of Rent Allowance options below. 
 
 
2.5  Stacking between FTP(A), FTP(B) and Parenting Payment (Partnered)  
Parenting Payment (Partnered) tapers after the spousal income exceeds $32 pw, at the rate 
of 50/70 per cent.  The FTB(B) tapers at 30 per cent on spousal income in excess of $32 pw, up 
Chart 5: impact of integration on disposable income: 
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to a cut-out of either $8,750 pa (child 5-15) or $10,500 pa (child 0-4).   The two tests will stack, 
implying high effective tax rates on spousal income, especially where the partner is a low wage 
earner.  This is illustrated in Chart 6, which shows that EMTRs for a spouse of a minimum wage 






If the spouse is considering a job, and her husband’s income is $28,200 pa, FTB (B) will 
stack with FTB (A), with the two payments tapering away simultaneously at the rate of 30 per 
cent each. With childcare costs, this could result in a substantial disincentive to her working.  
The fact that Childcare Assistance also commences to taper above $28,200 (at the rate of 10 per 
cent, one child or 15 per cent, if two or more) does not help this situation. 
It should be noted that these stacking problems are not new.  Partly they are due to the loss 
of the couple’s residual allowance over the income range between the husband’s earnings
10
 and 
$28,200 and, prior to the NTS, FTB(B) had a “sudden death” spousal income limit of $4,777 pa. 
                                                 
10   It is not easy to totally obliterate sexist assumptions without making the meaning incomprehensible.  For this reason I have 
persevered with the traditional male breadwinner model in explaining the current system, although it is technically no longer 
applicable. 
Chart 6 - spouse incentives: ANTS - NSA/PgA couple with 2 children at July 2000

































































20   
 
 
Clearly, it is preferable to have a more gradual taper as under the NTS, despite stacking 
problems.  However it would be even more preferable to get rid of such problems entirely. 
The basic issue here is that the social security system has moved beyond its traditional 
poverty-alleviation function and, through FTB(B), taken on the additional role of compensating 
for some of the indirect costs of young children – notwithstanding that it is paying this assistance 
to many people who are entirely outside of the workforce and for whom indirect costs are 
therefore a somewhat tenuous concept.  Since this assistance then has, for cost reasons, to be 
withdrawn as family income rises, the necessary implication is that there must be high EMTRs 
on working mothers.   
One solution is to get compensation for indirect costs out of the social security system and 
back into the tax system – eg, as a reinvigorated dependent spouse rebate.  However this view is 
totally at odds with developments in the social security system during the 1990s.  The other 
possible solution is to cash out compensation for indirect costs as a supplement to existing basic 
rates.  This would result in a single FTB system replacing FTB(A) and (B); the maximum rates 
would be as follows: 
 
Age         $pa 
0-4    5,618 
5-12   4,835 
13-15   5,638. 
 
The above table makes explicit another of the problems introduced into the system once it 
starts compensating for the indirect costs of children.  That is, the maximum rates of assistance 
first fall, then rise, with increasing age of the child.  This is contrary to the results of research on 
the relative (direct) costs of children.  However, the option of a single FTB with such a rate 
structure does at least make the system transparent. 
There may indeed be a case for providing some childcare assistance as a direct payment to 
mothers of young children, although the appropriate balance between cash assistance and fee 
reimbursement is itself a difficult issue.  A neat compromise is perhaps to make assistance for 
children independent of the age of the child, a structure now being pursued in the UK and which 
would not be very different to the NTS-based system proposed above. 
Chart 7 shows one example of the consequences of this option for EMTRs and disposable 
income.  In general the ‘front loading” of EMTRs for the spouse is reduced, but at the possible 
cost of backloading them higher up the income scale.  Another important consequence is that the 















Cashing out FTB(B) as a supplement to FTB(A) payments has two main consequences 
(apart from easing EMTRs on working mothers).  First, it provides substantial additional 
assistance to low income families where the mother is working. In this example she is a net 
gainer on any personal income between nil and $600 pw.  Second, it reduces assistance to high-
income families where the mother is not working
11.
 The incentive effects are likely to be 
favourable, on balance, to the workforce participation of low-income mothers.   
 
2.6 Childcare  assistance 
It would be highly desirable if the taper on childcare assistance could be reformed to avoid 
stacking problems with means tests on other payments.  In the UK system, for example, childcare 
assistance is part of the total Working Families Tax Credit, and abates sequentially.
12 
 This would 
also be possible in Australia and indeed this is the treatment suggested by Keating and Lambert 
                                                 
11  Assuming that access to the DSR is also restricted for such families.  This proposal would suggest that the DSR for those 
without children be abolished. 
12  Strangely enough, this is not true of housing assistance in the UK, which is a separate scheme and can stack quite severely 
with other tapers.  In Australia this is only true of state housing rental rebates, and Commonwealth RA does not stack.  Hence 
the Australian and UK systems are opposite.  Since secondary incomes are found to be more sensitive to incentives than 
primary ones, it may be the UK solution is a better one. 
Chart 7: comparison of ANTS vs FTB(B) unstacking option: spouse incentive, 
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(see below), although they were unable to cost it because of data limitations. 
An implication of treating childcare in this manner is that the cutout point for combined 
family payments, rent assistance and childcare assistance could be very high indeed, more so if 
the FTB taper were further reduced.  With four children, for example, the cutout would be well 
over $70,000 pa. The issue is, should this be regarded as a problem?   
There is good reason for suggesting that it should not.  Childcare assistance could validly be 
regarded as a horizontal equity-type payment, and indeed a logical alternative to our current 
means tested system would be a straightforward tax deduction for childcare costs.  Thus there is 
no need for concern about a system which allows childcare assistance to flow to quite high-
income earners, particularly those with several children.  Equivalence scale research tells us that 
such a family, on $70,000 pa, would not be better off than a childless couple on, say, $35,000 pa. 
Another argument in support of such an approach is that research on comparative fertility 
has suggested that fertility is higher, other things equal, in those countries that actively support 
working mothers’ labour force participation (McDonald 1997).  In this manner having children 
should not need to become an enormous sacrifice, in terms of foregone earnings.  Family policy 
in Australia will increasingly have to consider fertility as an important aim, in the context of 




2.7 Keating/Lambert  proposals 
The Keating and Lambert proposals, briefly described earlier, are designed to rationalise means 
tests for families.  The method is to first establish a family's potential entitlement for assistance, 
and then establish their actual entitlement on the basis of their assessed means.  For pragmatic 
reasons pensions and benefits would continue to have different free areas.  However, all tapers 
would become 50 per cent
14.
  At the family payment threshold of $542 pw ($28,200 pa), "second 
tier" payments would start to abate at a rate of 30 per cent.  This tier includes FTB(A) and (B), 
Youth Allowance and Rent Assistance , "and would have included childcare assistance if that 
had been possible [ie amenable to costing using NATSEM’s (Stinmod) microsimulation model]" 
(Keating and Lambert 1998b p283). 
Part of the proposal is financed by abolition of the quasi-universal component of FTB(A), 
and also of FTB(B).  In general the Keating and Lambert proposal is a sensible one, albeit that 
the administrative details need elucidation.  My main comment is that the objectives can be 
achieved more simply and directly by the options set out above (single taper for FTB(A), Youth 
Allowance unstacking and FTB(A) and (B) integration), which combined have a very similar 
effect to the Keating and Lambert plan but a simple set of pre-defined thresholds and sequential 




                                                 
13  Singapore, with a serious fertility problem, has recently announced a substantial ‘baby bonus’ for second and subsequent 
children. 




23   
 
 
2.8  Reduce allowance tapers? 
Keating and Lambert propose an allowance taper of 50 per cent. A 20 percentage point 
taper cut results in a net decrease in EMTRs of 16 percentage points (Chart 8)
15.
  This would 
address the ‘hot spots’ found among the allowance ETRs, but at the cost of blowing out the 






One advantage of reducing allowance tapers is that it reduces horizontal inequities as 
between allowees and pensioners.  At the moment, for example, there is a very substantial 
incentive for clients to apply for a Disability Support Pension, for example, rather than Newstart 
or Sickness Allowance.  While the higher basic rate for singles is one aspect of this, so too are 
the much more lenient means test conditions.   
This is illustrated in Chart 9, comparing single Newstart Allowees with single Disability 
Support Pension recipients (both receiving Rent Allowance).  The Chart shows that an initial 
                                                 
15  Reducing tapers will reduce EMTRs, but not quite to the same extent.  If the allowance is taxable, the extra tax payable will 
offset some of the benefit of the taper reduction.  If a 70 per cent taper is reduced to 50 per cent, and the tax rate applicable is 
20 per cent, then the old EMTR is (70 + .2*30)  = 76 per cent, and the new EMTR is (50 + .2*50) = 60 per cent. 
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differential of $25 pw in favour of the Disability Support Pension recipient becomes as high as 
$213 pw at around $350 pw of private income.  This is caused by the large difference in free 
areas and tapers for the different clients (the non-taxation of Disability Support Pension also 
contributes to this).  Rate and taper differences may also be manifested in the increasing rate of 





A similar issue arises for sole parents as opposed to mothers who are in a couple.  In the 
case of a 2 child family, the initial rate differential in favour of the couple, already quite low at 
$416 vs $494 pw (a ratio of .84), actually reverses at higher income levels and at a private 
income of $494 becomes negative, at up to $24 a week extra for the sole parent, before the two 
disposable income lines ultimately converge.  The superimposed EMTR graph in Chart 10 shows 
that this reversal is due to the lower (40 per cent) NTS taper on Parenting Payment for sole 
parents.  It is difficult to believe that the Government had this result in mind when it designed the 
NTS measures. 
Such anomalies can be addressed either by reducing allowance tapers or tightening pension 
ones.  Reducing tapers can be quite expensive, and extends benefits to relatively high-income 
levels — compared, for example, to low full-time wages.  For example, reducing the pension 
taper from 50 to 40 per cent in the NTS moved the age pension cut-out points from $21,320 pa 
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Currently, there are many full-time workers who have income below the allowance cut-outs 
but are ineligible for allowance because of the work test.  It would cost some $3 billion pa to 
extend eligibility to them. It is difficult to argue for this because it implies a role for 
unemployment payments quite different to the current philosophy, and also because of the 
difficulty in measuring the incomes of the self-employed.  But it is not difficult to argue that 
further extension of the allowance cutouts may not be a high priority; rather, priority should be 
placed on reducing tax on low-income families whether or not they are in the allowance system
16.
 
While this will be more costly it will help to preserve work incentives and maintain horizontal 
equity. 
The cost of fully aligning the allowance with the pension means test (including $3 billion 
                                                 
16  An earned income tax credit would be one instrument for reducing tax on the low paid, but Ingles (forthcoming) argues that 
there are problems with this, and alternative tax instruments are available.  There is also a range of ‘return to work’ payments 
such as the participation supplement favoured in the McClure Report (Reference Group On Welfare Reform pp28-30). 
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from extension of eligibility to full-time workers) is estimated to be as high as $14 billion pa, 
with a further $2 billion flow-on from the necessary increase in the FTB(A) threshold.   
Instead, pension tapers for those of working age could be dragged back more into line with 
those already applying to allowances, possibly with some small adjustment to iron out EMTR 
“hotspots”.  The ultimate aim might be a “single workforce age payment” with a simple common 
taper of, say, 60 per cent and utilising the existing allowance free areas of $31 pw per adult.  This 
would blow out the benefit cutout to about $30,400 pa for a couple (income split 50:50 – see 
Chart 11) with a consequent need to raise the family payment threshold by $2,200 pa, but overall 
the cost would be relatively containable.   
The concept of a single workforce age payment has been endorsed in the interim report of 
the Reference Group On Welfare Reform (2000a and b), albeit that the report is rather light on 
detail.  The basic problem is that a common payment based on pension conditions is probably not 
affordable unless the behavioural response were very large; whereas one based on allowance 
conditions would result in significant losses among some Disability Support Pension and sole 
parent (Parenting Payment) recipients.   
 





























27   
 
 
Basic rates could be standardised among the workforce aged, bringing the allowance rate up 
to the pension rate (possibly with some reduction for those under say 25), but could be 
supplemented by special allowances such as for costs associated with disability.  
Raising all allowance rates to the pension maxima would cost some $700m in a full year, 
but this cost will escalate progressively if the allowances were — like pensions — indexed to 
Male Total Average Weekly Earnings (MTAWE).  There would be further costs associated with 
any easing of means test parameters for allowances, and some savings from pulling back 
Disability Support Pension and sole parent means test parameters towards those prevailing in the 




The bottom line is that the social security measures in the government’s Tax Package have 
undercut what should arguably be the ultimate aim of commonality in rates and tapers across the 
workforce age population, and compounded serious horizontal inequities which already exist 
within the system.  The lower pension taper could have been restricted to the aged, where 
different considerations (notably relating to savings incentives and interaction with 
superannuation tax) apply. 
 
2.9  What should be done with Rent Assistance  
There are a number of anomalies in the current system of rent assistance, State and federal.  
Commonwealth Rent Assistance for those without children tapers beyond the pension or 
allowance cutout points, and at the same rate – ie, 50 per cent for pensioners and 70 per cent for 
allowees.  However assistance for those with children tapers out beyond the cutout points at the 
same 30 per cent rate as for basic family payments.  State public housing rent assistance phases 
out at around 20-25 per cent for a family income of around $20,000 (depending on family size), 
and thus stacks extensively with family payments and even allowance tapers.  As shown in Ingles 
1997, this can cause serious disincentives. 
Because of the large differences between the Commonwealth and State schemes, the 
Industry Commission (1993) recommended moving Commonwealth rental assistance to a State 
housing- type formula.  Such a move was not then desirable in the case of families because it 
would, at the time, have caused very serious stacking problems with the 50 per cent family 
payment means test taper.  
There are several options for Rent Allowance.  The most generous is that Rent Allowance 
not taper until all maximum family payments are lost.  This is the solution envisaged in the NTS, 
and also by Keating and Lambert — who extend the principal to Youth Allowance payments as 
well, and wished to extend it to childcare payments.  One obvious problem is that family 
payment cutouts rise significantly as the taper rate is reduced, with a corresponding rise in the 
costs of Rent Allowance. 
A less generous option (at least for families) is that Rent Allowance be de-coupled from the 
family payment system and, as recommended by the Industry Commission, be paid on similar 
                                                 
17  One option is its replacement with a single graduated deeming regime applying to all financial and non-financial assets.  This 
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lines to State Housing Rental Rebates (SHRRs), meaning that Rent Allowance would be allowed 
to stack with other means tests in the family payments system.  
With the family payment taper reducing to 30 per cent under NTS, or even 20 per cent 
under the proposals in this paper, this stacking problem could perhaps be lived with.  Stacking 
with basic allowance tapers could be resolved by indexing the Rent Allowance and SHRR 
thresholds to the allowance cutout points.   
This option creates the potential for savings that could be redirected to other parts of the 
Rent Allowance system.  If, for example, Rent Allowance were de-coupled from benefit 
payments to non-family couples and individuals and the taper reduced to that applying to 
families, RA would be transformed from an out-of work benefit mainly restricted to clients, to an 
in-work benefit that tapers only moderately with rising income.
18 
 Current inequities as between 
state housing clients and Commonwealth social security clients would be substantially 
ameliorated. 
There is a horizontal equity argument for allowing Rent Allowance to flow to quite high 
income households, since renters at all income levels have fewer resources than homeowners 
(but not necessarily homebuyers).  On this argument Rent Allowance is a sort of rough 
compensation for the non-taxation of imputed rent.  This argument supports the “long-tail” Rent 
Allowance taper. 
There is, conversely, a horizontal equity argument for making Commonwealth and State 
rent assistance more similar, one that supports allowing the tapers to stack.  This argument is 
somewhat weakened, however, by the very large differences in maximum assistance provided by 
the two systems.
19
  It ought to be the ultimate goal that the two systems converge. 
There is also the issue of horizontal equity between homeowners, homebuyers, and renters.  
The first best solution to this is simply to gross up all payments in the system to include an 
adequate component for housing costs, (including supplements for high cost areas like Sydney), 
and then tax back imputed income from wealth including housing wealth.  Since this is unlikely 
to obtain political support in the near (or even the distant) future, the second best solution is to 
support the regular payments made by renters and also homebuyers with small amounts of equity 
in their homes.  In the UK, for example, an extensive system of Housing Assistance helps home 
purchasers as well as renters. 
The government, in the GST compensation package, has chosen to revive the approach of a 
lump sum $7,000 subsidy for first homebuyers.  Very few people mourned the passing of the 
original First Home Owners Scheme in the 1980s. One option is that this subsidy should 
ultimately be abolished and be replaced by an extension of Commonwealth Rent Assistance to 
homebuyers based on means testing comprehensive assets — ie including housing equity.  Only 
in this manner can a comprehensive and neutral system of low income housing assistance be 
achieved. 
 
                                                 
18  Currently , where there are no dependent children RA tapers as a continuation of the allowance or pension taper applicable; 
ie, at 70 or 40 per cent. 
19  The value of state rental assistance typically exceeds Commonwealth Rent Allowance by a substantial margin - see Industry 








Whether such a system of housing assistance should be tapered sequentially with other 
family and Youth Allowance payments, or allowed to stack, should be decided at the time by 
reference to the tapers ultimately decided on.  If, for example, the family payment taper were 
reduced to 20 per cent (as proposed herein), a stacked housing assistance taper of say 20 per cent 
could perhaps be tolerated. 
 
 
2.10  Conclusion: the NTS and associated reforms 
The measures discussed here are essentially alternative means of implementing the 
Keating/Lambert proposal for a single, sequential tapering of all Commonwealth income support 
payments.  This, in turn, is not all that different from the Dawkins et al (1998) proposal for a 
negative income tax system with a three-part rate structure and an initial 60 per cent marginal 
rate.  It is shown here however, that it is possible to iron out the worst of current anomalies and 
ETR ‘hotspots’ by relatively simple changes to existing policy parameters. 
Moreover, the required measures are relatively inexpensive, in the case of Youth Allowance 
adding up to no more than $200-300m in a full year (note that this is a small amount in the 
context of the whole social security budget).  Furthermore, as Keating and Lambert have shown, 
it is possible to offset part and perhaps all of the other “unstacking” costs by relatively modest 
adjustments which phase out the remaining quasi-universal payments in the system, payments 
which have no clear rationale in the context of the main poverty alleviation aims of the 
Australian system.   
The question here, however, is whether the Government is willing to abolish those bits of 
“middle class welfare” remaining in the family payment system.  Although there is no reason to 
oppose universal family assistance as such,
20
 the existing two-part taper might be regarded as a 
half-baked compromise between poverty alleviation and horizontal equity objectives, and it is  
also noted that a substantial measure of horizontal equity is achieved by low tapers which allow 
means-tested assistance to flow into the mid-ranges of the (equivalent) income distribution. 
Apart from the single 20 per cent family payment taper proposal, it seems highly desirable 
that the main parts of the Youth Allowance and FTB(A) unstacking exercise should proceed.  
Whether Newstart Allowance and Parenting Payment (Partnered) tapers should be reduced is a 
difficult issue however.  The main problem is that this would exacerbate horizontal inequities 
vis-à-vis low income earners not in the categorical system, such as the self-employed.  I conclude 
that a single taper of 60 per cent, with the current thresholds, may be as far as can sensibly be 
gone in the absence of more fundamental structural changes. 
Ingles’ ‘unstacking” agenda, Keating and Lambert “family accounts” and the Dawkins et al 
modified negative income tax all end up looking quite similar in terms of their ultimate effects 
on financial incentives and families’ disposable incomes.   
 
                                                 
20  From an economic efficiency perspective it may not matter much whether family benefits are taxed back more severely, or 
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The Australian income support system is very close — certainly the closest in all the OECD 
area — to academic views of a pure NIT system, except for some aberrations around the edges, 
and the presence of activity tests.  Further and more fundamental reforms aimed at enhancing the 
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3  Appendix A: The NTS changes to assistance for families
21 
To accompany the changes to the personal income tax system, the Government will introduce 
substantial reforms to the various forms of assistance provided to families through the income 
tax and social security systems. These reforms will boost the amount of the income tax cuts that 
families receive, substantially improve work incentives for low and middle income families and 
simplify the complex array of assistance provided currently to families. 
Extra assistance is provided to families by extending the Family Tax Initiative (FTI), 
introduced by the Government in January 1997, at a cost of over $2 billion in 2000–01. 
The FTI currently provides an increase in the tax-free threshold of $1,000 for each 
dependent child, plus an extra $2,500 for single income families with a child aged under 5 years. 
From 1 July 2000, these thresholds will be doubled to $2,000 and $5,000 respectively. The effect 
of this is that all single income families (including sole parents) with a child under 5 years will 
have an effective tax-free threshold of $13,000. This is made up of the new $6,000 tax-free 
threshold plus $2,000 for one dependent child and the further $5,000 provided to single income 
families with young children. Overall, such families have a tax-free threshold that is more than 
double the general $6,000 threshold. 
For families, the doubling of the FTI means: 
•  an increase in assistance of $140 a year (a 70 per cent increase) for each dependent child; 
and 
•  an extra $350 a year (a 70 per cent increase) for single income families with a child aged 
under 5 years. 
 
Other elements of the families package. 
Improving incentives for families to work, including the unemployed. 
The current system of assistance for families, particularly the overlap between the various 
income tests for benefits, results in disincentives for low and moderate-income families to work. 
Many families face an effective marginal tax rate of 85.5 per cent or more if they increase their 
income. 
To remove these overlaps and disincentives, the Government will, from July 2000, ease 
substantially the income test for Family Allowance by: 
•  increasing the level of income at which it begins to be income tested from $24,350 a year 
(for one child) to $28,200 a year; and 
•  reducing the income test taper rate from 50 per cent to 30 per cent. 
These measures provide substantial extra income to help lower income families raise their 
children and improve work incentives. They ensure that unemployed families will not incur a 
sudden drop in Family Allowance (and hence income) when they leave the income support 
system, improving incentives for them to obtain a full-time job. 
                                                 









At the same time, these measures, combined with the tax cuts, will ensure that low income 
working families will have much better incentives to improve their circumstances. For example, 
their effective marginal tax rate will drop from 85.5 per cent to 61.5 per cent over a substantial 
range of income. 
 
Simplifying the structure and delivery of Family Assistance 
Building on these increased levels of assistance and greater work incentives for families, the 
Government proposes to greatly simplify the structure of assistance for families, with effect from 
July 2000.  The new structure will reduce the types of assistance for families through the tax and 
social security systems from twelve to three.  
 
Family Tax Benefit, Part A 
First, it is proposed that the four forms of assistance provided to help families with the costs of 
raising children [ie Minimum family Allowance, family Allowance, Family Tax Payment (FTP) 
part (A) and Family Tax Assistance (FTA) part (A)] will be merged into one benefit, the Family 
Tax Benefit, Part A (FTB (A)). This will: 
•  have the same rate structure as the programs it replaces (ie maximum and minimum rates), 
but with the extra $140 a year for each dependent child outlined above; 
•  use the relaxed income test for Family Allowance outlined above for the maximum benefit 
(ie a threshold of $28,200 a year and a 30 per cent taper rate); 
•  replace the ‘sudden death’ income tests for minimum Family Allowance, Family Tax 
Payment (FTP) and Family Tax Assistance (FTA) with a single relaxed income test for the 
minimum FTB(A) of $73,000 a year (plus $3,000 a year for each child after the first) and a 
taper rate of 30 per cent; 
•  abolish the assets test that applies currently to Family Allowance and minimum Family 
Allowance; and 
•  be increased annually in line with movements in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in the 
same manner as applies currently for Family Allowance. 
 
Family Tax Benefit, Part B 
Second, it is proposed that the six forms of assistance provided to single income families 
(including sole parents) [Basic Parenting Payment, Guardian Allowance, Family Tax Payment 
Part B, Dependent spouse rebate (with children), Sole parent rebate, and Family Tax Assistance 
part B] will be merged into a Family Tax Benefit, Part B (FTB (B)). This will: 
•  have a similar rate structure to the current system (ie with the level of assistance being 
higher where the youngest child is aged less than 5 years), but with 
•  the additional $350 a year for single income families (including sole parents) with a child 
under 5 years outlined above; 
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single-income family with two children aged over 5 years receives an additional $341 a 
year comprising $280 plus an additional $61; 
•  for couples, replace three different income tests on the non-working partner's income with 
one test that has a free area of $1,616 a year and a 30 per cent taper (thereby increasing the 
cut-out point for assistance from $6,090 a year to $10,500 for a family with a child aged 
under 5 years): 
•  this will greatly improve work incentives for primary carers (who are usually women); 
•  abolish the FTA/FTP income test on the working partner's (or sole parent's) income that 
applies currently from $65,000 a year; and 
•  be indexed annually in line with movements in the CPI in the same manner as applies 
currently to Family Allowance. 
 
Child Care Benefit 
Third, it is proposed that the two forms of assistance available to help families with the costs of 
childcare outside the home will be merged into one. The new benefit will greatly simplify 
government assistance for childcare costs, enabling families to receive all assistance with 
childcare through the one program and under one set of rules. The Child Care Benefit will 
provide: 
•  maximum assistance (for 50 hours of work-related care per week) of $116.40 a week per 
child in formal care, with an additional $11 a week loading where there are 2 children in 
care and a $32 a week loading for 3 or more children in care; 
•  for informal work-related care, the maximum level of assistance is $20.10 a week per child 
in care (for 50 hours of care); 
•  a single income test, with a family income threshold of $28,200 a year (for formal care) and 
taper rates of: 
    · 10 per cent for one child in care; 
    · 15 per cent and (above $66,000) 25 per cent for 2 children in care; 
    · 15 per cent and (above $66,000) 35 per cent for 3 or more children in care; 
•  the income test will not apply for incomes above $78,400 (one child in care). This will, in 
effect, maintain entitlements to assistance (equivalent to that available under the Childcare 
Cash Rebate at the 20 per cent rate) for higher income families. 
Compared to the current system, the Child Care Benefit will provide an increase in the 
maximum level of assistance of $7.50 a week. This will be of particular benefit to 200,000 lower 
income families, who receive the maximum level of assistance. 
 
Delivery of family assistance 
The Government's reform of family assistance will also simplify and integrate the delivery of 
such assistance to Australian families.  Currently, the 12 forms of assistance for families are 
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Commission. A new Family Assistance Office (FAO) will be set up within the Tax Office to 
deliver the new simplified set of family assistance programs.  
The FAO will be a joint venture between Centrelink and the Tax Office that will specialise 
in delivering assistance to families. It will enable families to deal with just one agency and one 
set of rules. The primary carer in the family (generally the mother) will have a choice as to how 
they wish to receive their assistance either through regular fortnightly payments to their bank 
account, as reduced tax deductions from their (or their partner's) pay-packet or as an end-of-year 
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Appendix B: Youth Allowance unstacking proposal 
The following proposals address the issues identified in the text. 
1.   Align the Youth Allowance threshold with the new FTB(A) threshold at $28,200 pa.  The 
cost is estimated at $100 million pa. 
2.  Provide disregards for siblings under 16 in the Youth Allowance means test sufficient to 
fully exhaust FTB(A) entitlement before the Youth Allowance taper cuts in.   
The necessary disregards, after July 1, are as follows: 
under  13    $6593  pa 
13 - 15      $9216 pa 
These compare with current disregards of $1200 for a first sibling under 16; $2500 for 
second and subsequent. The cost is $85m pa.  The effect of the higher disregards is that all 
FTB(A) would exhaust before the Youth Allowance income tests cuts in, so EMTRs will 
not normally exceed 55 per cent.
22 
 
The Youth Allowance income test stacks on itself if there is a Youth Allowance 
sibling – that is, payments for both siblings can taper simultaneously. This stacking is 
ameliorated but not abolished by virtue of the relatively high disregard for second and 
subsequent Youth Allowance children.  High EMTRs for families with several dependent 
Youth Allowance recipients could be addressed by increasing the Youth Allowance sibling 
disregard or, equivalently, by the reintroduction of variable tapers for families with 
different numbers of such dependents. 
Splitting tapers is preferred to higher disregards because this allows all Youth 
Allowance recipients to receive their appropriate rate of allowance.  In terms of the 
families’ aggregated entitlement to Youth Allowance, the two approaches are identical. 
23
 
3.   Raise the taper for Youth Allowance from 25 per cent to 30 per cent, and re-introduce split 
tapers of 15 per cent for 2 Youth Allowance children; 10 per cent for three.  Abolish the 
existing sibling concessions ($3,400 for other Youth Allowance siblings, $7,400 for two 
Youth Allowance children living away from home).  The cost is negligible: an estimated 
$11 million.  The savings from the higher taper (applying to the three-quarters of families 
with a single Youth Allowance child) almost offset the costs of the split tapers (which 
benefit the other quarter of Youth Allowance families). 
4.   Standardise income period definitions by moving the Youth Allowance test from previous 
financial year to current financial year, as for FTB (A).  (No costing available: this would 
probably provide some savings.
24)
  
                                                 
22  However, they could exceed this because YA will continue to stack with rent allowance and, in some cases, the taper on 
FTB(B). 
23  Some previous versions of AUSTUDY did allow variable tapers where there was more than one AUSTUDY recipient. 
24  The FTB system now uses a full current year basis, with end-of year reconciliation through the tax system.    The Youth 
Allowance income test is based on income in the tax year two or at most one year prior (with some exceptions for, eg, the 
self-employed).  It would appear a logical step to reconcile these very different income assessment periods by using a 
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These options would pave the way for an possible full integration of Youth 
Allowance and FTB(A) up to, say, age 21, as a single scheme with common income 
definitions, etc.  This should be the long-term aim of reform in this area. 
5.  One outstanding issue in the YA area is the personal income test applied to the individual 
YA recipient, in addition to the family income test.  The individual test for students is 
derived from the Austudy system; there is a free area of $236 per fortnight ($6,136 pa)
25 
and a taper of 50 per cent up to $8,216 and 70 per cent beyond.  The young unemployed, by 
contrast, have taper parameters derived from the Newstart allowance system; ie a free area 
of $62 per fortnight ($1612 pa), a 50 per cent taper to $142 per fortnight ($3692 pa), and a 
70 per cent taper beyond.   
      This is clearly anomalous in itself, and the student taper is anomalous if it were 
desired to introduce a common workforce age allowance.  On the other hand the parameters 
proposed for such an allowance (free area of $1612 pa and a 60 per cent taper) could be a 
substantial disincentive to a student’s part-time or vacation earnings, and moreover appear 
harsh when one considers that this applies in addition to the parental income test. 
      A reasonable suggestion, therefore, would be that the test on a dependent’s own 
earnings should be simply an extension of the parental test, so that in effect the payment to 
the student or unemployed young person becomes independent of the distribution of 
earnings within the family.  This implies that a simple 25 or 30 per cent taper should apply 
to the student’s own income, but this should only apply once the families’ total income 
threshold is exceeded.  That is, this taper would apply once the combined family income 
(student plus parents) exceeds $28,200 plus any additional disregards for other siblings. 
                                                 
25  An ‘income bank’ allows student Youth Allowance recipients to accumulate up to $6,000.00 of any unused portion of their 
fortnightly income-free area  Income bank credits can be used to offset any income earned that exceeds the fortnightly 
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